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This study aims at analysing the association between Earnings Management and non-
GAAP reporting practices taking into account an apparent increase of the managers´ 
desire in disclosing non-GAAP earnings (Jeanjean, Martinez and Davrinche, 2018). I 
perform a research based on data collected from Factiva and Amadeus databases. The 
study sample is composed by 2 122 listed companies, from 14 European countries, 
covering a time horizon from the years 2011 to 2018. To measure Earnings Management, 
I use the Jones model (1991), adjusted by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), in order to 
estimate abnormal accruals. Empirical findings suggest that this kind of disclosures is 
correlated with higher levels of accrual-based earnings management (AEM) signifying 
that a disclosure of non-GAAP numbers follows an opportunistic motive. I also provide 
evidence indicating that the practice of non-GAAP reporting is correlated with downward 
AEM indicating that are strategically used as complement tools. This assumption is not 
consistent with Doyle, Jennings and Soliman (2013) and Black, Christensen, Taylor and 
Schmardebeck (2017) conclusions. Additionally, the obtained results suggest that 
executives who managed their earnings downwards are more likely to disclose non-
GAAP reports. Moreover, the company´s complexity and the presence of a Big 4 auditing 
firm influence the practice of non-GAAP disclosures. My work contributes to extant 
research enabling the development of knowledge about an association of these two widely 
addressed academic fields, so far weakly explained by prior research. 
 







O propósito deste estudo é analisar a associação entre gestão de resultados e a 
divulgação de resultados non-GAAP tendo em conta o aparente aumento do desejo, por 
parte dos gestores, em divulgar este tipo de resultados (Jeanjean, Martinez e Davrinche, 
2018). Foi realizada uma pesquisa baseada em dados obtidos através das bases de dados 
Factiva e Amadeus. A amostra do estudo é composta por 2 122 empresas cotadas, de 14 
países europeus, cobrindo um horizonte temporal dos anos de 2011 a 2018. De modo a 
calcular a medida de gestão de resultados, foi utilizado o modelo de Jones (1991), 
ajustado posteriormente por Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), de maneira a estimar 
accruals discricionários. Os resultados mostram que a divulgação de relatórios non-
GAAP se rege por um motivo oportunista, tendo em conta que, forneço evidência empírica 
que indica que este tipo de divulgação está correlacionado com altos níveis de gestão de 
resultados baseada em accruals (AEM). As descobertas empíricas sugerem ainda que, a 
prática de divulgação non-GAAP está relacionada com AEM negativa, indicando que são 
estrategicamente utilizadas como métodos complementares. Estes resultados não são 
consistentes com as conclusões obtidas por Doyle, Jennings and Soliman (2013) e Black, 
Christensen, Taylor e Schmardebeck (2017). Tendo em conta a direção da gestão de 
resultados baseada em accruals, os resultados obtidos indicam que os gestores que 
manipulam os seus resultados financeiros com o intuito de reduzi-los são mais propensos 
a divulgar relatórios non-GAAP. Adicionalmente, a complexidade da empresa, e a 
presença de uma firma de auditoria Big 4 são vistos como fatores que influenciam a 
prática de divulgação de relatórios non-GAAP. As conclusões obtidas através desta 
pesquisa permitem o desenvolvimento do conhecimento inerente a uma, até então 
debilmente explicada, associação entre dois campos académicos largamente abordados 
pela literatura existente. 
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Earnings are a recognised reflection of the financial performance of a company. 
Managers are allowed to strategically use the relative flexibility given by GAAP (or IFRS 
when applied) to manage their earnings, although without straying from implicit rules. 
The purpose of these manipulations differs but it is generally associated with the 
achievement of operational, financial or investing objectives and related to an illustration 
of a wealthy image of the company. This practice is known as earnings management. 
Non-GAAP reporting is considered as an alternative option to this behaviour, 
characterised by the exclusion of unusual events and arbitrary accounting adjustments 
from GAAP earnings.  This kind of reports is available, for all financial information users, 
through unconventional routes, such as press releases. 
This research aims at analysing a possible strategic association between earnings 
management practices and non-GAAP earnings reporting. Therefore, the main objective 
of this study is exploring to what extent the practice of earnings management may 
influence, or not, a disclosure of non-GAAP earnings.  
Both practices have a rich body of previous literature. There is a considerable number 
of alternative earnings management mechanisms managers could apply including accrual 
earnings management (AEM), real earnings management (REM) and classification 
shifting. All previously mentioned tools are used within GAAP, that is, are regulated and 
several rules and principles must be followed. However, companies have an alternative 
way to manage their earnings beyond regulated disclosure channels through a report of 
the well-known non-GAAP earnings. This type of disclosure is an attractive alternative 
perception management instrument since external auditors are not required to audit non-
GAAP earnings, which grows the potential to be used for opportunistic purposes. In fact, 
in Europe, there are just recommendations attend to this practice, and no mandatory rules 
regulate non-GAAP reporting.   
To measure earnings management, I use the total and absolute value of abnormal 
accruals using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) developed 
later by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), which is widely used in literature.  
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The difficulty in analysing this kind of disclosures lies in differentiating honest from 
opportunistic disclosures (Black, Christensen, Kiosse and Steffen, 2017). Prior research 
debates that managers use non-GAAP earnings to give transparency to their numbers or, 
in opposition, these type of disclosures are used to avoid reporting losses or to portray 
better performance as an opportunistic move  (Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman, 2003; 
Christensen, 2007; Black and Christensen, 2009; Malone, Tarca and Wee, 2015).  
There is a probability that both metrics are used as substitutes of each other, consistent 
with Doyle, Jennings and Soliman (2013) finds, who provided statistical evidence 
supporting the idea that AEM and non-GAAP reporting are considered as substitutes and 
not complement tools. Supported by this idea, I perform a test to investigate whether these 
practices simultaneously applied promote a substitution effect. 
Besides, there is a possible sequential notion behind the occurrence of these events, 
since a report of non-GAAP earnings can be made after the decision to use AEM. This 
idea is supported by the fact that the implicit adjustments in non-GAAP numbers do not 
affect actual operating and financial reported GAAP earnings. Therefore, I investigate 
what level of earnings management will lead to non-GAAP reporting considering a 
timeline of events. 
The main motivation related to this research is linked to an apparent increase in 
managers´ desire to disclose non-GAAP numbers (Jeanjean, Martinez and Davrinche, 
2018). This study contributes to extant research linked with both academic fields: 
earnings management within GAAP and non-GAAP reporting. Several other studies 
compare non-GAAP and GAAP earnings metrics to explore which one is more relevant 
for assessing company´s performance (Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Marques (2006) and, 
more recently, Black and Christensen, 2009; Doyle et al., 2013; Black, Christensen, 
Kiosse and Steffen, 2017). There is prior research that investigates the strategical 
association between earnings management and non-GAAP reporting (Doyle et al., 2013; 
Black, Christensen, Taylor and Schmardebeck, 2017). While Doyle et al. (2013) settled 
a time horizon from 1988 to 2009 in their main analysis, Black et al. (2017) limit their 
tests to observations in the sample of 1998 through 2006. In this study, I use a research 
sample based on post-crisis observations since this event created a deviation of the 
common use of earnings management (Filip and Raffoumier, 2012; Iatridis and Dimitras, 
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2013; Dimitras, Kyriakou and Iatridis, 2015). Moreover, Doyle et al. (2013) and Black et 
al. (2017) sample was built on a US companies’ basis. In 2003, the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) creates a regulation – Regulation G – aimed at controlling and 
regulating the measure of non-GAAP earnings. In Europe, several recommendations aim 
also to promote the transparency of non-GAAP earnings. Nevertheless, they are just 
recommendations and therefore are not mandatory. Thus, the practice of such disclosures 
may be differently affected by imposed regulation. Consequently, I use a sample 
composed by data from European listed companies, precisely, a sample of 2 122 listed 
firms, from 14 European countries. 
The results showed that a disclosure of non-GAAP numbers follows an opportunistic 
motive and suggests that both practices are strategically used as complement tools, 
inconsistent with both Doyle et al. (2013) and with Black., Christensen, Taylor, 
Schmardebeck (2017) conclusions. I perform an additional analysis which supports the 
main analysis results regarding the positive correlation between negative accruals and 
non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Considering the direction of accrual-based earnings 
management, the obtained results suggest that executives who managed their earnings 
downwards are more likely to disclose non-GAAP reports. I also develop an additional 
test to guarantee the robustness of the obtained results. 
This study is divided into six sections. In the second chapter we can find the literature 
review and the hypotheses of investigation. Chapter 3 refers to the used methodology. 
Chapter 4 shows the analysis of the obtained results. Chapter 5 describes additional 
analyses performed. Finally, chapter 6 presents the study`s main conclusions and 
limitations. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a countless number of previous researches concerning earnings management. 
It is possible to find several articles addressing, its causes and consequences (Putra et al., 
2018), comparisons and correlations between their different strands (Cohen, Dey and Lys 
2008; Badertscher, 2011; Yang, Ying and Zang, 2013), its influence on the quality of 
earnings themselves (Lo, 2008) or even the relation between the generality of financial 
information users (auditors, investors or regulators) and manipulated earnings (Miranda, 
Machado and Macedo, 2018; Safitri, Kustono and Miqdad, 2018). However, only a few 
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are making a direct bridge between earnings management and non-GAAP earnings. There 
is a considerable number of alternative mechanisms to manage earnings and influence the 
perception of financial information users, executives could apply, some within and others 
beyond regulated disclosure channels, including accruals earnings management, real 
earnings management, classification shifting, and non-GAAP reporting. Since each 
accounting choice has implicit benefits and costs, it is the net incentive of each one that 
will determine the final management´s decision. In fact, Marquardt and Wiedman (2003) 
discussed the potential costs of earnings management organised in two groups: “detected” 
and “undetected” earnings management, referring to cases that executives use methods to 
manage earnings that becomes publicly known and to cases that firms use these 
mechanisms but there is no clear events that would expose its existence to the public. 
They conclude that the method used by firms to manage earnings depends on a 
combination of cost and benefits related to each choice and the cost associated to 
“detected” earnings management tends to be lower. In addition, potential costs linked 
with such practices may diverge for different income statement´s items. In prior studies, 
the respective authors usually tend to differentiate recurring from non-recurring items and 
make their research samples analysis in accordance with both factors (Bradshaw and 
Sloan, 2002; Palmrose and Scholz, 2004). They find that firms are increasingly defined a 
large percentage of their expenses as non-recurring.  
2.1. Accrual Earnings Management, Real Earnings Management and Classification 
Shifting 
Accrual Earnings Management (AEM) may be considered an attractive and popular 
choice, being a measure of earnings distortion, by two main reasons. Firstly, because it 
has no direct effect on cash flows and, in consequence, it is less probable to have an effect 
in firm´s future value. Secondly, it can be performed in agreement with GAAP´s 
standards. However, the reversing feature linked to AEM can arise some problems as the 
company has to overcome the potential reversal of last period´s accruals management 
first in order to create impact in the current year (Badertscher, 2011), which may be allied 
with a decreasingly desire in practice continued AEM over time. In fact, companies 
become increasingly constrained in use AEM after multiple periods (Bradshaw, 
Richardson, and Sloan, 2001; Dechow, Hutton, Kim, and Sloan, 2012).  
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Another measure related to earnings management is the real earnings management 
(REM), which can be classified by a purposeful changing in the timing of an operating, 
financing or even an investing decision. In other words, is defined as a group of 
management decisions that diverge from normal business practices (Roychowdhury, 
2006). Extant research find evidence that suggests that some executives use REM to 
achieve strategic targets (Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012). Bens, Lin and Sbaraglia, 
(2002) provide evidence that executives finance the repurchase of stock by reducing R&D 
expenditure, owing to an apparent fear of earnings per share (EPS) dilution. Thus, if 
management cuts R&D expenditures to improve net income of the current year, the firm 
future value may be negatively affected because of the lost opportunities due to decreased 
R&D.  Bhojral, Hribar, Picconi and Mclnnis (2009) shows that companies have worse 
operating subsequent performance when they try to beat analyst forecast by combining 
AEM and REM. In contrast, there is evidence suggesting that companies that practice 
REM have better operating performance in the subsequent three years than firms that do 
not engage in such practice (Gunny, 2010). 
An alternative method mentioned in previous literature is classification shifting. The 
presence of this management strategy can be validated when managers move and 
misclassify items within the income statement while net income remains unchanged 
(McVay, 2006). The most common practice of classification shifting seems to be the 
action of moving operating expenses to income-decreasing discontinued operations 
(Barua, Lin, and Sbaraglia, 2010).  Haw, Ho and Li (2011) and  Zhang and Guo (2016), 
who analysed a sample composed by Asian companies,  defend that classification shifting 
is used to mislead investors about company´s performance since information users seem 
to be confused by this measure of earnings management. In conclusion, classification 
shifting seems to have impact on earnings quality. 
Zang (2012), for example, provide evidence that companies appear to use a 
combination of these tools (AEM and REM) to meet or beat analysts’ expectations but 
there is also prior research suggesting that executives make trade-offs between both 
earnings management mechanisms based on relative benefits and costs of these decisions 
(Cohen et al. 2008; Badertscher, 2011). Zang (2012) finds that executives use REM 
before AEM, explained by the fact that AEM´s practices tend to take place after, or near, 
the end of the fiscal year while REM takes place during the fiscal year. This preference 
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may also be partially driven by the increased regulation regarding AEM in the post-
Sarbanes-Oxley (Cohen, et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). Nevertheless, there is literature 
suggesting that listed companies tend to adopt AEM and reduce REM, in order to not 
damage the company's future value, when they have high executive compensation and 
lower executive shareholding (Yang et al. 2013). This tendency may be explained by the 
fact that REM is costlier than AEM, because of its hostile impact on cash flows and, 
consequently, on business operations, which will grow its potential to pull down firm´s 
future value. On the other hand, AEM is costlier than REM since it is subject to auditor 
restrictions at higher level. 
Abernathy, Beyer and Rapley (2014) argue that executives are making trade-offs 
between different earnings management´ methods, based on their costs, restrictions and 
timing (AEM, REM and classification shifting). Based on Abernathy et al. (2014) 
research, classification shifting is privileged over REM when the firm is characterised by 
poor financial condition, high levels of institutional ownership and low industry market 
share. On the other hand, they found that managers seem prefer classification shifting 
over AEM when the former is constrained by low accounting system flexibility. 
Concluding, classification shifting may be a substitute financial instrument to manage 
reporting outcome since it is not used in complementarity with other measures.  
Overvaluation is another important determinant of executives´ earnings management 
decisions. In fact, it seems that overvalued firms are more likely to engage in GAAP 
earnings management in order to sustain the overvalued equity (Badertscher, 2011). The 
same author argues that during the sustained period of overvaluation, managers privilege 
AEM over REM in the early years while non-GAAP earnings management is only 
practiced as a last resort. 
2.1.1 The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Earnings Management 
Given the alterations in the economic environment affected by the global financial 
crisis of 2008, several studies examined its impact on financial reporting. Prior research 
argues that firms appear to engage in earnings management during financial crisis to 
attempting meet debt covenants and analysts´ expectations (Lisboa, 2017). However, 
there is statistical evidence suggesting that companies tend to reduce earnings 
management practices during crisis and recession years, regarding a few exceptions 
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according to the characteristics of the country, such as high debt level and low liquidity, 
where the companies run its business activity (Iatridis and Dimitras, 2013; Dimitras, 
Kyriakou and Iatridis, 2015). Filip and Raffoumier (2012), in order to evaluate the effect 
of global financial crises in Europe, performed a research covering a period from 2006 to 
2009 and observed that the scope of earnings management practices has decreased during 
crisis years in comparison with previous periods. Yet, this conclusion is not verified for 
all European countries. Francis, Hasan and Wu (2013) defend that this event increases 
the request for high quality financial reporting, while LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that 
conservatism reduces the ability of executives in applying earnings´ manipulation 
methods since this fact increase the quality of earnings . Thus, following Cimini, (2015)´s 
conclusions, a strict monitoring activity from auditors correlated with an increase of 
conservatism, towards a reporting quality increase, during crisis years are linked with the 
reduction of earnings management practices.   
2.2. Non-GAAP Earnings 
Managers have a fourth choice to manage their earnings and stakeholder perceptions, 
applying non-GAAP reporting. Following the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) rule 33-8176, the non-GAAP financial measure can be defined as a “numerical 
measure of a registrant’s historical or future financial performance, financial position or 
cash flows that includes amounts that are not part of the most directly comparable GAAP 
measure or excludes amounts that are part of the most directly comparable GAAP 
measure”1, meaning the exclusion of unusual events and arbitrary accounting adjustments 
from GAAP earnings. This type of disclosures is not required to be audited by external 
auditors which makes this type of disclosure an attractive alternative perception 
management instrument that may be used to mislead information users. Besides, there is 
other advantage since the cost related with Non-GAAP reporting is probably lower 
compared with AEM and REM due to the implicit regulation being generally not so strict. 
Furthermore, this kind of disclosures is helpfulness for time-series comparisons than 
GAAP, by the fact that is characterised by the exclusion of unusual events (Halsey and 
Soybel, 2002). 
 
1 I use “non-GAAP earnings”, “non-IFRS earnings” and “pro forma earnings” as denominations with 
similar meaning. 
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Non-GAAP earnings may represent a process of communication with analysts and 
general financial information users. “Adjusted earnings” is a well-known concept for 
most investors, therefore, non-GAAP disclosures may help enhance consistency in the 
financial communication process (Young, 2014). Although, it is difficult to identify the 
motive behind this communication, whether it is the users´ demand or the company´s 
decision to provide information attempting to give clearer financial information. Thus, a 
non-GAAP disclosure may be associated to motives related with external or internal 
nature. There is evidence stating that analysts´ forecasting errors and dispersion are lower 
in the subsequent year for those companies that disclose non-GAAP earnings, indicating 
the utility this kind of disclosures might have for external market agents (Malone, Tarca 
and Wee, 2015). Then, stick with Malone et al. (2015) conclusions, it seems that these 
disclosures are not following an opportunistic move practiced by managers.  
These adjustments may reflect a divergence of underlying motives, that are hard to 
disentangle to market agents, such as investors, auditors or regulators. The differentiation 
of honest disclosures, which managers attempt to highlight their core earnings 
sustainability, from an opportunistic point of view that may be motivated by the desire of 
managers to overstate firms performance, might be seen as a problematic topic (Black, 
Christensen, Kiosse, and Steffen, 2017). The discretionary nature of non-GAAP measures 
allows managers to find an opportunity to distort financial information users´ perception 
utilising communication methods, such as impression management, to convince them that 
these reported numbers are a better and clearer representation of the firm´s performance 
(Guillamon-Saorin, Isidro and Marques, 2017). These authors provide evidence 
suggesting that managers use a combination between impression management and non-
GAAP reports characterised by exclusions of recurring items, but the market recognise 
when high levels of this communication technique are applied. However, Doyle, 
Lundholm and Soliman (2003) defend that stakeholders fail to fully understand the 
implication of these exclusions for firm´s future performance, which increases the 
probability of being deluded by this kind of disclosures.  
Some previous research pointed out what statements´ items are more willing to be 
disclosed through a non-GAAP report. For example, the non-GAAP EBITDA, adjusted 
earnings per share (EPS) or adjusted net income disclosures differ. It seems that adjusted 
EBITDA is the most common measure to be reported beyond GAAP channels (Isidro and 
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Marques, 2008). Following the same authors, the other two most representative measures 
are adjusted EPS and adjusted net income. The disclosed item may differentiate the reason 
behind such reports since these authors argue that managers are not aware that EBITDA 
disclosures relate to non-GAAP measures giving the impression that executives tend to 
inform the market when disclose such item. 
Managers have the ability to disclose non-GAAP numbers after the decision to use 
either AEM or REM (related with GAAP metrics), since the implicit adjustments that 
characterised this type of disclosures do not disturb the actual financial statements 
reported within GAAP. Following empirical evidence provided by Gelb and Zarowin 
(2002), there is an association between greater information disclosures and stock prices 
which will benefit investors, supporting an important Doyle et al. (2003)´ argument, that 
GAAP earnings may need to be supplemented by non-GAAP earnings since the former 
may not provide enough value relevant information. Brown and Sivakumar (2003) and 
Marques (2006)  highlight that non-GAAP earnings are more relevant than GAAP 
earnings in terms of representation of firms performance and some stakeholders rely 
severely on these numbers (Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen and Mergenthaler, 2007), 
although this disclosed earnings may not be considered reliable by all users of financial 
statements information. Additionally, prior research defend that these disclosures are 
appropriate to reduce the information asymmetry by providing value relevant information 
to stakeholders, along with other information users, and better reflecting core earnings 
being more permanent than GAAP results  (Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen and Larson 
(2003); Doyle et al., 2003; Black and Christensen, 2009). 
Black and Christensen (2009) and Doyle et al. (2013) provide evidence suggesting 
that the managers´ desire to meet strategic earnings targets influences a disclosure of 
earnings on a non-GAAP basis whether the GAAP measures give the impression to be 
unsatisfactory. According to Bowen, Davies and Matsumoto (2005) managers usually 
strategically emphasise the numbers related to the most favourable profitability rate, 
which is, in most cases, the non-GAAP numbers since are generally related with adjusted 
calculations characterised by exclusions of expenses items. Prior literature documents 
that, when AEM measure seems to have a higher cost due to balance sheet restrictions, 
managers are more likely to exclude expenses from non-GAAP earnings in order to meet 
or beat analyst expectations, indicating that both metrics are used as substitute tools 
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(Doyle et al., 2013). Overall, managers tend to practice non-GAAP reporting when within 
GAAP earnings management is constrained (Doyle et al., 2013; Black, Christensen, 
Taylor and Schmardebeck, 2017). Still concerning an association between GAAP and 
non-GAAP earnings, Black, Christensen, Taylor and Schmardebeck (2017) argue that 
companies that used earnings management mechanisms in prior periods, are more likely 
to report non-GAAP earnings that exclude recurring items. 
There is a focus in prior literature in exploring what types of exclusions may promote 
the outcome of a non-GAAP report. Previous research suggest that the type of the 
excluded item influence the motive behind non-GAAP reporting, being linked with 
opportunistic or informative non-GAAP disclosures (Christensen, 2007). Christensen 
(2007) found evidence suggesting that managers are more likely to exclude recurring 
items, such as depreciation and R&D expenses, on a non-GAAP basis to achieve strategic 
earnings benchmarks. This is consistent with Isidro and Marques (2015) finds, arguing 
that executives in countries with strong institutional and economic conditions are more 
likely to exclude expenses such as R&D, amortizations and tax expenses. In addition, 
Malone et al. (2015) investigated the extent to which IFRS earnings fair value 
remeasurements are associated with the voluntary disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, 
observing that companies seem to highlight unrealised items or those related with 
ambiguity measures, such as impairment expenses, along with considered non-recurring 
items. Moreover, some firms seem to report lower non-GAAP earnings numbers 
compared with GAAP numbers before extraordinary items since managers exclude non-
recurring gains, that are connected with exceptions of normal business activity, indicating 
that at least some managers seem making this kind of disclosures guided by honest 
motivations (Black and Christensen, 2009). They also argue that the motive behind non-
GAAP reporting may be explained through a combination between the nature of earnings 
exclusions with the achievement of strategic targets on non-GAAP basis, which may 
differentiate it in informative or opportunistic motivation.  
The manipulation of GAAP numbers has an extra cost since are within accounting 
standards connected with an implicit reporting regulation. On the other hand, non-GAAP 
earnings disclosures benefit from being lightly regulated2 and self-defined by managers. 
 
2 Non-GAAP reporting is lightly regulated in the USA but has no implicit regulation in Europe. 
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Accordingly, the rules and principles regarding financial reporting can be defined as an 
external force that affects disclosures (Bushman, Piotrski and Smith, 2004). Yet, it is not 
the only factor that may influences managers´ disclosure practices since there is prior 
literature indicating that the country´s institutional features, where the company runs its 
activity, may influence managers. Consequently, these factors create impact on reported 
earnings (Burghstahler, Hail and Leuz  2006; Leuz, 2010). The pressure experienced by 
managers to meet expectations or desired benchmarks, which will affect decisions about 
information disclosures, seems to be stronger in legally and economically developed 
countries, characterised by strict regulation implementation and high scrutiny over 
financial reporting, which is related to a reduction of earnings management practices  
(Isidro and Marques, 2015). According to this statement, the same authors provide 
evidence suggesting that in countries with “efficient legal systems, strong investor 
protection, developed capital market and good communications channels” (Isidro and 
Marques, 2015, p. 124), managers have an extra incentive to use non-GAAP reporting to 
meet earnings benchmarks since manipulation within GAAP is constricted.   
2.2.1. Non-GAAP Reporting Regulation 
With the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), in 2002, and with the enactment of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation – the Regulation G – in 2003, 
aimed at controlling and regulating the measure of non-GAAP earnings, there is statistical 
evidence that the use frequency of this type of disclosure initially declined (Entwistle, 
Feltham and Mbagwu, 2006), but increased sharply in the years after that (Brown, 
Christensen and Elliot, 2012). Following SEC, this regulation, item 10(e),  required that 
non-GAAP reporting must follow two different principles related to GAAP: (i) “present 
the most directly comparable financial measure calculated and presented in accordance 
with GAAP” and (ii) “reconcile the differences between the non-GAAP financial measure 
and the most directly comparable GAAP measure”. More recently, as a result of the 
financial crisis in 2008, the SEC has renewed its emphasis on non-GAAP reporting and 
declared it a “fraud risk factor” resulting in additional regulation in January 2010 (updated 
on July 2011) and again in May of 2016 (updated in October of 2017). As seen, 
Regulation G may be considered an external force that affects opportunistic non-GAAP 
disclosures. Jennings and Marques (2011) found no evidence that non-GAAP earnings 
mislead investors after the adoption of Regulation G in the USA, indicating that 
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regulation may decrease opportunistic disclosures. Black, Christensen,  Kiosse and 
Steffen (2017) examined the influence of SOX and Regulation G on a sample pre-SOX 
and post-SOX non-GAAP reports. They provide evidence that even though this regulation 
has achieved its intended purpose and negatively influenced aggressive3 non-GAAP 
disclosures, some managers still appear to approve recurring items exclusions from non-
GAAP reports. European financial bodies, such as CESR, ESMA and IOSCO, also create 
several recommendations with the underlying objective of give transparency and 
consistency to non-IFRS earnings (Jeanjean et al, 2018). However, these European 
financial bodies only formulate recommendations, and therefore are not mandatory. Up 
to the present day, no rule or regulation, with similar characteristics of Regulation G, was 
applied in Europe. 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
Executives have several earnings and perception management alternative tools they 
could apply, where their selection between each one seems to be associated to the net 
incentive of each one (excluding the costs from the benefits). In this study, I emphasise 
the relation between earnings management (focusing on AEM) and non-GAAP 
disclosures. Consequently, the main question that I will explore is ascertain if executives 
that already manage their earnings, using earnings management mechanisms, will also 
report non-GAAP earnings.  
As seen in the previous section, prior international literature debates what motives are 
behind non-GAAP reporting. The majority agrees that there are two designed underlying 
motivations. There is an information (or honest) motive, when managers only attempt to 
highlight their sustained core earnings, or an opportunistic motivation connected with the 
managers´ desire to overstate firms´ performance misleading information users´ 
perception. The difficulty lies in differentiate them. Doyle et al. (2003) defend that 
managers are making non-GAAP earnings disclosures, trying to provide clearer financial 
information to the market. This is consistent with Black and Christensen (2009) and 
Malone et al. (2015) conclusions, who defend that non-GAAP reporting follows an 
information (or economic) motive rather than opportunistic. However, Christensen 
 
3 “Aggressive” non-GAAP exclusions and “recurring items” non-GAAP exclusions are used in 
literature as denominations with similar meaning. 
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(2007) defends that the exclusion of recurring items from non-GAAP reports follows an 
opportunistic move by managers. Besides, since in Europe this type of disclosures is not 
regulated, managers have an extra incentive for an opportunistic practice of non-GAAP 
reporting which enhances the likelihood of investors being misled in European countries.   
I start by investigating the motive behind these type of financial information 
disclosures related with the level of earnings management practiced by managers, a 
differentiation between economic and opportunistic motivations. In order to do it, I will 
use adjusted net income disclosures as a reference for non-GAAP reporting. 
 As seen in the section 2.2., previous academic literature usually connect non-GAAP 
earnings with motivations related to meet or beat analyst´s expectations and essentially 
to portray better performance. These factors will lead to higher non-GAAP numbers 
comparing with GAAP, concluding that such type of disclosure is typically used to 
improve earnings. In fact, Isidro and Marques (2015) and Jeanjean et al. (2018) point that 
disclosed non-GAAP earnings are, in most cases, higher than reported GAAP operating 
earnings. Although, Black and Christensen (2009) provide evidence about the fact that 
some firms exclude non-recurring gains on their non-GAAP reports resulting in lower 
earnings comparing with GAAP numbers before extraordinary items, indicating that 
some managers appear to report adjusted earnings just for economic reasons. However, 
the exclusion of non-recurring gains does not affect the ultimate purpose of reporting non-
GAAP earnings, it just makes its potential number be higher than the actual one, 
continuing being greater than GAAP number. Thus, a disclosure of such kind is related 
with an improvement of earnings such as an upward earnings management (positive 
accruals).    
 Hypothesis 1: If managers perform accrual-based earnings management, a 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings follows an opportunistic move, thus leading to more 
earnings management.  
Following the last reasoning, I expect that economic motive behind this type of 
disclosures is related to low levels of accruals, while opportunistic motive is associated 
with higher intensity of accruals.  
Within an opportunistic motive there are 2 possible variations to have into 
consideration. Firstly, it is possible that both metrics (earnings management and non-
FRANCISCO ARANDA CORREIA: AN ESSAY ON STRATEGIC USE OF NON-GAAP REPORTING AND ACCRUAL-





GAAP reporting), when simultaneously used, promote the effect of complementarity.  
Such disclosures correlated with upward earnings management will cause the same result, 
that is increase earnings. So, if a manager uses both metrics, he or she will use them for 
the same reason, substituting a metric with the other, consistent with Doyle et al. (2013) 
finds, who provided statistical evidence supporting the idea that AEM and non-GAAP 
reporting are considered as substitutes and not complement tools. Secondly, there is a 
probability that both metrics are used as complements of each other. As opposition, I 
expect that an opportunistic motive is related to positive discretionary accruals. Non-
GAAP reporting correlated with downward earnings management will lead to similar 
results. While a manager uses a non-GAAP disclosure to show improved earnings, he or 
she is, at the same time, improving them by using upward earnings management (positive 
accruals). Thus, it will be created a substitution effect between both metrics.  
Hypothesis 2: Earnings management and non-GAAP reporting are used as substitute 
tools. 
The last hypotheses (1 and 2) do not explore the presence of these events in terms of 
chronology. These disclosures can be made after the decision to use accrual earnings tools 
since the implicit adjustments do not affect actual operating and financial reported 
statements. Thus, I intend to explore what level of earnings management will lead to a 
report of non-GAAP earnings. I expect that downward accruals, or no earnings 
management at all, are the motive that will trigger the desire of reporting non-GAAP 
earnings. If executives manage their earnings upwards will nullify the earnings 
management effect upon the non-GAAP disclosure. Moreover, upward earnings 
management will consequently higher up the fiscal burden, so there is no economic sense 
in reporting non-GAAP earnings after that. However, when executives manage their 
earnings downwards there is a “loss” in need of being compensated. In this case, it is 
necessary an existence of a future disclosure in order to explain and reimburse that “loss”.    
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3.1. Sample characterization 
I collected non-IFRS earnings data from press releases by searching on Factiva 
database from January 2011 to December 2019. In order to identify non-GAAP reporting, 
it was used different keywords such as “non-GAAP”, “non-IFRS”, “proforma”, “pro-
forma” and “core earnings”. It was coded a company-year observation as practicing non-
GAAP reporting if the company discloses non-GAAP earnings (adjusted net income) 
quarterly or just as a final yearly report. The remaining data has been extracted from 
Amadeus database. The time horizon was set from the year of 2011 to 2018 and takes into 
consideration European listed companies from Euro 154 with available data to perform 
the statistical tests. Companies linked with financial, insurance or public administration 
industries, was readily excluded from the study sample since have specific accounting 
system and regulation, which will affect the practice of earnings management on a 
different way. Additionally, was excluded industries with less of 6 related companies 
(industry Education - P - was excluded). Then, industries Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
(A), Mining and quarrying (B), Human health and social work activities (Q) and Arts, 
entertainment and recreation (R) were also excluded for the motive that any related 
company presents non-IFRS reporting. Besides, companies from Luxemburg were also 
excluded from the sample for the same reason. 
The final sample contains 2 122 firms, from 14 European countries, originating 12 
465 company-year observations. The proportion of companies practicing non-IFRS 
reporting is 7,00%.  
France, Germany and Sweden are the countries with higher representation on the 
sample, with 24,30%, 20,75% and 14,81% observations respectively. This information is 
available in Appendix – Table I. 
Professional, scientific and technical activities (M), Manufacturing (C) and 
Information and Communication (J) are the industries with higher representation on the 
 
4 Euro 15 is a group of 15 European countries used in empirical analyses composed by Austria, 
Belgium, Deutschland, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden.  
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sample, representing 34,23%, 24,81% and 13,74% of the observations respectively. This 
information is available in Appendix – Table II. 
3.2. AEM measure 
Different models have been developed in order to detect earnings management. 
Following innumerable prior studies, I use abnormal accruals to proxy to earnings 
management. I follow one of the most recognised and widely used approaches to separate 
discretionary5 accruals from total accruals. Specifically, I use the modified Jones model 
(1991), developed later by Kothari et al. (2005), who includes return-on-assets from the 
beginning of the year as variable to control the impact of company´s performance on 
abnormal accruals, and use the residuals from the cross-sectional modified Jones model 




=  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1






+ 𝛼4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 : Total Accruals for company i, in year t 
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 : Total Assets for company i, at the beginning of year t 
∆REV𝑖,𝑡 : Change in Total Revenue (sales) for company i, from t-1 to t 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 : Gross Property, Plant and Equipment for company i, in year t 
ROA𝑖,𝑡 : Return-on-Assets of company i, in year t, calculated as the ratio of Net 
income in year t and Total Assets in year t-1 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 : Abnormal Accruals (ACC) 
From this equation (1) were estimated the α coefficients for every single year within 
a period of 8 years (from 2011 to 2018) and for each of the 13 industries existing on the 
sample, with a regression for each industry individually. The estimation of the previous 
regression has the objective of getting total accruals, considering the regression residuals 
as discretionary accruals. 
 
5 Discretionary accruals are also known as abnormal accruals. 
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I define Total Accruals (TA) as presented in the following formula in accordance with 
the same authors (equation 2): 
(2)  𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡  − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡  
Where: 
∆CA𝑖,𝑡  : Change in Current Assets for company i, from year t-1 to t  
∆CL𝑖,𝑡  : Change in Current Liabilities for company i, from year t-1 to t 
∆Cash𝑖,𝑡 : Change in Cash and equivalents for company i, from year t-1 to t 
       ∆STD𝑖,𝑡 : Change in short-term debt for company i, from year t-1 to t 
Dep𝑖,𝑡 : Amortizations and Depreciations for company i, in year t  
Thus, the earnings management measure will be built as the form of accruals by total 
(ACC) and absolute value (ABS_ACC) and later by direction (downward, reducing 
earnings and upward, improving earnings).  
3.3.  Empirical Models 
In this chapter, it will be defined and explained the models used to test the previously 
presented hypotheses. 
To explore what kind of motives are behind the desire of managers to report non-
GAAP earnings and what type of effect a correlation between this practice with earnings 
management can occur and, consequently, test hypotheses 1 and 2, I developed the next 
empirical model (equation 3). 
 
(3)   𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽2 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3 𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +
                          𝛽5 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽6 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖,𝑡 
The index i and t concerns each company and year, respectively. 
The variable ACC corresponds to abnormal accruals calculated through the modified 
Jones model developed by Kothari et al. (2005), as the previous section indicates, in 
absolute terms (ABS_ACC) and total value (ACC). The following variables are defined 
and explained in section 3.3.1.. 
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 Then, I examine the direct relation between earnings management practices and 
reports beyond regulated disclosure channels, specifically accrual-based earnings 
management, and non-GAAP reporting. This analysis is made concerning a possible 
sequential notion related with the events occurrence. To estimate hypothesis 3, I 
developed a logit regression (equation 4), following models already presented in previous 
literature (Isidro and Marques, 2015; Black, Christensen, Taylor and Schmardebeck, 
2017), although it is built with the necessary adjustments related with the study´s topic. 
(4) Pr(𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 = 1)
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝐿𝑃𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐴𝐶𝐶_𝑁𝐸𝐺_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽4 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽5 𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽8 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽9 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑤𝑖,𝑡 
The index i and t concerns each company and year, respectively. 
The dependent variable NG corresponds to a dummy variable coded 1 if the company 
reports non-GAAP earnings, and 0 otherwise, as described in the sample characterization 
section. Concerning the remaining variables, firstly I include ACC, corresponding to 
abnormal accruals calculated through modified Jones model developed by Kothari et al. 
(2005) in total value as the previous section indicates. The model also contains a variable 
(ACC_LPNG), coded 0 if the company did not report non-GAAP earnings on the last 
period. This variable is representing the company need of reporting non-GAAP earnings 
continually in order to avoid a break of information that will possibly lead to a loss of 
confidence by financial information users. Investors and other information users may see 
this discontinuity action as attempting to disrupt their perception. Besides, this variable 
will capture what level of accruals, in the current year, is related with a non-GAAP 
disclosure, in the previous period. 
Finally, the dummy variable ACC_NEG_LPNG is defined as a supplement of the 
previous one. I include this variable to capture the probability of a non-GAAP report 
when managers perform such disclosures in the previous period and manage their 
earnings downwards in the current year. It’s coded 1 if the company presents negative 
accruals when there is a disclosure of non-GAAP in the last period and 0 otherwise.  
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3.3.1.  Control Variables  
 Regarding the previous models, it was included several control variables for factors 
that prior research identifies as associated to voluntary accounting decisions and related 
with previous studies about earnings management and non-IFRS earnings. 
With the objective of capture the company´s complexity, I include the variables Age 
and Size. Age, corresponds to the age of the company measured as the logarithm of years 
(Black, Christensen, Taylo and Schmardebeck 2017). Additionally, there is a possible 
relationship between the size of the company with the degree of earnings management 
practices. Prior research suggest that larger companies tend to have lower levels of 
earnings management than smaller companies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). On the 
other hand, Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) provided evidence that there is no relation 
between both factors. Next, Jeanjean et al. (2018) argue that complex firms are more 
likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings for two different reasons: one in which managers 
tend to have opportunistic behaviour in influencing users´ perception since complex firms 
are difficult to monitor and another in which managers only may want to reduce earnings 
asymmetry and provide clearer financial information seeing that GAAP earnings alone 
may be insufficient. In fact, Jeanjean et al. (2018) found a positive correlation with the 
size of the company. Thus, it was included a variable to control for company´s size, 
measured as the logarithm of the firm´s total assets. 
I include a variable to control for the international well-known of auditing firms 
(BIG4), coded 1 if the company is audited by a Big4 auditing firm and, 0 otherwise. 
According to DeAngelo (1981), Big4 firms provide higher quality services since they 
have increased pressure to maintain a wealthy reputation which may reduce the ability of 
executives in managing their earnings through GAAP channels. With a certain association 
to these results, Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam (1998) and Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2005) has shown that Big4 auditing firms restrict earnings management 
practices resulting in a direct link between both elements. Additionally, Francis and Wang 
(2008) state that earnings quality is greater as investor protection becomes stronger, but 
only for clients of Big4 firms. 
Since scrutiny of shareholders is expected to influence non-GAAP disclosures 
(Jeanjean et al., 2018), I include two variables as measures of scrutiny: decreasing 
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performance and debt level. In order to explore situations of decreasing performance, it 
was included a dummy variable named Loss (Jeanjean et al., 2018). It is coded 1 if the 
company has a negative net income and, 0 otherwise. Statistical evidence, provided by 
previously mentioned authors, suggests that the lower the company´s debt level the higher 
the probability of non-GAAP disclosures. In order to control for debt level, I include a 
variable Leverage measured as the sum of long and short-term debt dividing by total 
assets. Additionally, according to DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Roychowdhury 
(2006), there is a positive correlation between debt level and the degree of earnings 
management, meaning that, the higher the leverage rate the higher the intensity managers 
have in managing their earnings. 
According to Butler, Leone and Willenborg (2004), growing companies have greater 
pressure to maintain their performance when they are leading with financial distress. 
These factors may motivate an increase in earnings management practices to sustain these 
needs. Linked with this statement, Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) demonstrate that 
growth rate has a positive effect on earnings management. In opposition, Gunny (2010) 
defend that growing companies are less willing to manipulate their earnings through 
earnings management mechanisms. Additionally, following Kolev, Marquadt and McVay 
(2008), it is expected that sales growth is correlated with non-GAAP earnings. Thus, I 
control for performance, including in both models the variable Growth, measured as the 
percentage of change in sales. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The table I provides the descriptive statistics for all company-year observations 
between 2011 and 2018 with available data to perform the tests. According to the results, 
2,704% of the sample are related to non-GAAP earnings disclosures and the average level 
of abnormal accruals of European listed companies is -0,0283, meaning that, on average, 
companies practice earnings management to reduce them. There is, on average, a slightly 
tendency to reduce earnings by accruals management tools when a company discloses 
non-GAAP earnings on the previous period (-0,0008). Finally, about 2,7% of the 
observations are linked with companies that exhibit negative accruals and report on last 
period non-GAAP earnings. 
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Analysing the control variables, while the average age of Euro 15 listed companies is 
about 29 years (𝑒3,370257), the average growth rate is 12,593%. Lastly, 29,02% of the 
sample companies reported negative net income at the established study time horizon and 
the average company presents a leverage rate of 22,51%. 
Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median 
Standard-
Deviation Min. Max. 
NG 12465 0,0270 0 0,1622 0 1 
ACC 12465 -0,0283 -0,2422 0,1732 -4,5078 6.,3912 
ABS_ACC 12465 0,0832 0,0481 0,1545 0 6,3911 
ACC_LPNG 12465 -0,0008 0 0,0134 -0,3820 0,4440 
ACC_NEG_LPNG 12465 0,0207 0 0,1424 0 1 
AGE 12465 3,3703 3,2958 0,7456 0 6,3172 
BIG4 12465 0,4551 0 0,4980 0 1 
GROWTH 12465 0,1259 0,0403 0,7695 -0,9987 18,8928 
LOSS 12465 0,2902 0 0,4539 0 1 
LEVERAGE 12465 0,2251 0,1530 0,2251 0 0,9982 
SIZE 12465 5,2171 5,1284 1,0707 1,8987 8,6610 
Variables: NG Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings and, 0 otherwise; ACC Total abnormal 
accruals; ABS_ACC  Total abnormal accruals in absolute value; ACC_LPNG Total abnormal accruals if the company 
disclose non-GAAP earnings on the last period; ACC_NEG_LPNG Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-
GAAP earnings having negative accruals and, 0 otherwise; AGE Logarithm of the company´s age in years; BIG4 
Dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm and, 0 otherwise; GROWTH Growth rate by 
percentage of change in sales; LOSS Dummy coded 1 if the company has negative net income and; 0 otherwise; 
LEVERAGE  Debt level (short and long-term) in percentage of total assets; Size Logarithm of company´s total assets. 
 
4.2 Pearson´s correlation matrix 
Table II provides the Pearson´s correlation among all variables. Overall the variables 
present low levels of correlation between each other. The results allow us to assess 
existence of a negative correlation between the dependent variable NG and ACC, 
consistent with Black, Christensen, Taylor and Schmardebeck (2017) results. The results 
suggest that the higher the size of the company, age or its debt level the higher the desire 





of reporting non-GAAP earnings. In opposition, lower the growth rate lower the desire to practice such disclosures. In opposition, the fact 
that the company is audited by a Big 4 or presents negative net income is correlated with downwards AEM. Additionally, leverage is also 
negatively correlated with ACC. The fact of a company has a positive net income or, consistent with Black, Christensen, Taylor and 
Schmardebeck (2017) results, be associated with a BIG 4 auditing firm are positively correlated with non-GAAP reporting.           
Table II. Pearson´s Correlation Matrix 
 NG ACC ABS_ACC ACC_LPNG ACC_NEG_LPNG AGE BIG4 Growth LOSS LEVERAGE SIZE 
NG 1           
ACC -0,0024 1          
ABS_ACC -0,0260 0,0427 1         
ACC_LPNG -0,1738 0,0681 -0,0060 1        
ACC_NEG_LPNG 0,4240 -0,0228 -0,0228 -0,5903 1       
AGE 0,0544 0,0243 -0,1422 -0,0143 0,0446 1      
BIG4 0,0473 -0,0174 -0,0194 -0,0081 0,0414 0,0882 1     
GROWTH -0,0053 0,1096 0,1604 0,0039 -0,0545 -0,1036 0,0024 1    
LOSS -0,0532 -0,1354 0,1445 0,0179 -0,0545 -0,1833 -0,1006 0,0218 1   
LEVERAGE 0,0222 -0,0037 -0,0388 -0,0078 0,0267 0,0279 -0,0379 -0,0332 0,1333 1  
SIZE 0,2440 0,0421 -0,1913 -0,0934 0,2221 0,3521 0,2820 -0,0747 -0,3218 0,1557 1 
Variables: NG Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings and, 0 otherwise; ACC Total abnormal accruals; ABS_ACC  Total abnormal accruals in absolute value; 
ACC_NG Total abnormal accruals if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings on the last period; ACC_NEG_NG Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings 
having negative accruals and, 0 otherwise; AGE Logarithm of the company´s age in years; BIG4 Dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm and, 0 otherwise; 
GROWTH Growth rate by percentage of change in sales; LOSS Dummy coded 1 if the company has negative net income and; 0 otherwise; LEVERAGE  Debt level (short and long-
term) in percentage of total assets; SIZE Logarithm of company´s total assets. 






Regarding the sign of AEM, measured by ACC variable, there is a positive correlation 
with age, growth, and size. This means that growing companies or those which have high 
levels of complexity are correlated with upwards AEM. 
Finally, the intensity of AEM, measured by ABS_ACC variable, is negatively 
correlated with the general of the remaining variables.  It seems that there is a tendency 
to low levels of earnings management in the current year if the company disclose non-
GAAP earnings in the last period since ACC_LPNG and ACC_NEG_LPNG exhibit 
negative coefficients (-0,0060 and -0,0228, respectively). These results also suggest that 
the intensity of AEM has a positive correlation with growth rate and with a negative net 
income launch by the company on its income statement. 
Additionally, all considered independent variables added to the model have low levels 
of correlation between them, confirming their independence. 
4.3 Regressions Results 
On the following table (table III), I present the results obtained from the estimation of 
the first regression model defined in section 3.3., discriminated in two different equations 
where the related dependent variable differed in ABS_ACC (1) and ACC (2). While the 
analysis of regression (1) allows a study concerning the earnings management intensity 
practiced by companies, an analysis of regression (2) permits an investigation about the 
direction of accrual-based earnings management. In order to validate hypotheses 1 and 2 
is necessary a simultaneous framework of both regressions. It is important to state that 
the majority of the coefficient signs are according with expectations. 
There is a greater intensity on the practice of earnings management when associated 
with a report of non-GAAP earnings. This assumption comes from the fact that NG 
variable has a positive coefficient (0,0187) on regression (1) with 95% statistical 
confidence. Therefore, regarding the underlying motive, I may conclude that a manager 
who practices such disclosures tends to follow an opportunistic motive, since it applies 
greater intensity to the management of the company´s earnings. In conclusion, the first 
hypothesis is validated according to inherent expectations. The coefficients of age and 
size variables in regression (1) are negative (-0,0151 and -0,0244, respectively), meaning 
a lower intensity of earnings management. Thus, the higher the company´s complexity 
the lower the level of accruals earnings management. 
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The negative correlation exhibited by the size variable is consistent with Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) study who provide evidence that smaller companies have a greater 
probability of managing earnings since bigger companies are subjected to higher scrutiny 
in terms of regulation.  
In opposition, when a company is growing in sales or it is audited by a Big 4 auditing 
firm, since these variables exhibit positive coefficients (0,0279 and 0,0052, respectively), 
meaning a higher intensity of earnings management. The positive correlation presented 
by the growth variable follows Tendeloo et al. (2005) conclusions. These results 
concerning Big 4 auditing firms are not consistent with Becker et al. (1998) and Tendeloo 
et al. (2005), which respective studies point to a negative correlation, but are consistent 
with the correlation matrix presented in previous section.  
Concerning the shareholders´ scrutiny captured by the leverage variable, it appears 
that that the higher the debt level the higher earnings management intensity (0,0008). This 
conclusion concurs with DeFond and Jimabalvo (1994) and Roychowdhury (2006) 
studies results. However, no statistical-based conclusion can be made since this variable 
is not statistically significant. 
On the other hand, an analysis of regression (2) might be used to explore the second 
hypothesis concerning the established idea about the possible effect of substitution 
promoted by the simultaneous use of both practices. The negative coefficient (-0,0165), 
with a level of statistical significance of 10%, presented by NG variable, allows to 
confirm that a non-GAAP disclosure is correlated with negative accruals, that is, a 
downward earnings management. This fact suggests that both practices are 
simultaneously used for different purposes. Non-GAAP reporting is used to improve 
earnings, while AEM is used to reduce them. Therefore, I may conclude that there is 
complementarity effect. These results are not in accordance with Doyle et al. (2013) and 
Black, Christensen, Taylor and Schmardebeck (2017) studies, settling that both practices 
are used as substitute tools. In sum, hypothesis 2 is not validated. 
According to the results, I provide evidence that company´s complexity influences 
the direction of accruals. The coefficient signs of age and size variable are positive 
(0,0037 and 0,0093, respectively). Thus, the higher company´s complexity, which is 
reflected by company´s age and size, the higher is the sign of accruals.  
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Additionally, it seems that companies tend to manage their earnings downwards when 
they have the presence of a Big 4 auditing firm (-0,0102). Big 4 firms have an increased 
pressure to provide higher quality services and maintain good reputation (DeAngelo, 
1981), consequently this negative correlation may be explained by the possible force that 
Big 4 auditing firms apply on their clients to not improve earnings through AEM, in order 
to avoid a loss of financial numbers´ transparency traced to disrupt investors´ perception. 
Contrarily, a growing firm appears to practice AEM to improve earnings, seeing that the 
growth variable presents a positive coefficient (0,0259). These coefficient signs concur 
with Pearson´s correlation matrix results showed in the previous section.  
























Constant 0,2615*** -0,0969*** 
  (26,25) (-8,46) 
NG ? 0,0187** ? -0,0165* 
  (2,20)  (-1,68) 
AGE ? -0,0151*** + 0,0037* 
  (-7,70)  (1,64) 
BIG4 - 0,0052* ? -0,0102*** 
  (1,66)  (-2,85) 
GROWTH + 0,0279*** + 0,0259*** 
  (15,91)  (12,84) 
LEVERAGE + 0,0008 ? -0,0126 
  (0,10)  (-1,49) 
SIZE +/- -0,0244*** + 0,0093*** 
   (-7,70)  (5,45) 
COUNTRY   YES   YES 
YEAR   YES   YES 
Obs   12465   12465 
R-squared  0,0669 
 0,0188 
P-value   0,0000   0,0000 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The t test statistics is 
presented in parenthesis.  
(1) Regression results (ABS_ACC) ; (2) Regression results (ACC) 
Variables: ACC Total abnormal accruals; ABS_ACC Total abnormal accruals in absolute value ; NG 
Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings and, 0 otherwise; AGE Logarithm of 
the company´s age in years; BIG4 Dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm 
and, 0 otherwise; GROWTH Growth rate by change in sales; LEVERAGE  Debt level (short and 
long-term) in percentage of total assets; Size Logarithm of company´s total assets. 
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Finally, regarding the only non-statistically significant variable, leverage has a 
positive correlation (regression 2) suggesting that managers improve earnings through 
AEM mechanisms the higher the debt level presented by companies. Yet, no statistical-
based conclusion can be made. 
In order to validate hypothesis 3, I developed a second model defined also in the 
section 3.3.. This model was advanced for the objective of analysing a possible correlation 
between non-GAAP reporting and AEM concerning a timeline of events. Thus, it 
explores what levels of earnings management higher up the probability of managers 
disclose non-GAAP earnings. The results obtained by the estimation of the mentioned 
model are presented in the table below (table IV). 
By the analysis made from the table IV, the probability of a manager disclose non-
GAAP earnings seems to be higher when they manage their earnings downwards through 
AEM channels since the coefficient of ACC variable presents a negative sign. However, 
this variable is not statistically significant, so no statistical-based conclusion can be made. 
Continuing the analysis, the variable ACC_NG coefficient is positive, with a statistical 
significance level of 1%. Thus, there is a higher probability of a non-GAAP report in the 
current year when a company practice AEM and reported non-GAAP earnings in the 
previous year. There is a possibility that financial information users see non-GAAP 
reporting´s discontinuity as attempting to mislead their perception. Although, I interpret 
this result as evidence indicating that managers try to put away that possibility since the 
result suggest that managers privilege non-GAAP earnings reporting´s continuity. 
Additionally, the variable ACC_NEG_LPNG also exhibits a positive coefficient 
(statistical confidence of 99%), suggesting that, there is a higher probability of a non-
GAAP disclosure if the company practices downward AEM in the current year and made 
such disclosure in the last period. These results also confirm the predicted expectations 
about the idea of continuity of such disclosures. Therefore, the downward AEM fact allied 
to a continued non-GAAP reporting positively affect the probability of such reports. The 
hypothesis 3 is validated. 
Based on the obtained results, there is a tendency to practice such disclosures when 
a company has a lower age and is growing in sales (AGE has a positive coefficient with 
statistical significance of 90% of confidence). 
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Table IV. Results from the logit regression model 
The negative correlation presented by the AGE variable is not consistent with the 
conclusions obtained by and Black, Christensen, Taylor and Schmardebeck (2017). 
Besides that, consistent with Jeanjean et al. (2018); results, the variable Size has a positive 
coefficient with a statistical significance of 99% of confidence, meaning that the higher 


















      -10,7321***  
(-18,72) 
ACC ?        -0,1160 




























BIG4 +      0,2560* 




Growth ?      0,1211 




LOSS +      0,2191 
       (1,20) 
Leverage -      -0,6891* 




Size +      1,2003*** 




COUNTRY            YES 
YEAR           YES 
Observations       12465 
R-squared           0,3294 
P-value           0,0000 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The z test statistics is presented in 
parenthesis.  
Variables: NG Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings and, 0 otherwise; ACC Total abnormal 
accruals; ACC_LPNG Total abnormal accruals if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings on the last period; 
ACC_NEG_LPNG Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings having negative accruals and, 0 
otherwise; AGE Logarithm of the company´s age in years; BIG4 Dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by a 
Big 4 auditing firm and, 0 otherwise; GROWTH Growth rate by change in sales; LOSS Dummy coded 1 if the 
company has negative net income and; 0 otherwise; LEVERAGE  Debt level (short and long-term) in percentage 
of total assets; SIZE Logarithm of company´s total assets. 
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Following Jeanjean et al., (2018); and according to results showed by table III, I argue 
that this conclusion may be projected by one reason. Complex firms’ managers may want 
to reduce earnings asymmetry, since GAAP earnings alone are insufficient to understand 
performance, having an information motive to disclose such earnings. 
On the other hand, results suggest that the lower the leverage rate the higher the 
probability of reporting such disclosures, as pointed by Jeanjean et al. (2018). Following 
the conclusions from the same authors, a negative net income promotes a higher 
probability of non-GAAP reporting, which is consistent with the results of this study. If 
a company reports a negative GAAP net income may be forced to compensate and explain 
that loss through a non-GAAP disclosure. However, such variable is not statistically 
significant.  
Lastly, it is possible to state that the presence of a Big 4 auditing firm increases the 
probability of a non-GAAP earnings disclosure (statistical significance of 10%). 
Tendeloo et al. (2005) showed that Big4 auditing firms restrict earnings management 
practices. Therefore, it is possible that managers try to find some manipulation freedom 
in non-GAAP reports. 
Finally, it is important to state that the calculation of abnormal accruals, mentioned in 
the section 3.2., include year and industry-fixed effects based on NACE6 (Nomenclature 
of Economic Activities) main section codes. While every single regression defined in the 
section 3.3., was controlled for year and country.  
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
5.1. The effect of companies from France and Germany 
The sample used to perform this study is largely composed by French and German 
companies as presented in Appendix – Table II (24,30% and 20,75% respectively). This 
means that 45,05% of the observations group is composed by companies from 2 countries 
in 14 countries panoply, which may form a sample weakness. Therefore, to guarantee the 
robustness of the main analysis, I perform the estimation of the already mentioned 
regressions, deprived of French and German companies.  The sample is now composed 
 
6 NACE (Nomenclature des Activités Économiques dans la Communauté Européenne) is the European 
statistical classification of economic activities, attributed to each organization according to their business 
activity. 
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by 6 849 observations from 1 229 companies. The representation of non-GAAP reporting 
is reduced to 2,1% of the observations. 
As seen, on table V, the results obtained are, in general, identical to those exhibited 
previously. Regarding regression (1), the statistical significance of the same variables is 
maintained, and the coefficients obtained have the same sign, that is, the conclusions 
concerning each variable are the same. The leverage variable makes up an exception of 
this conclusion since experience a change of coefficient sign but still non-statistically 
significant.  
Table V. Results from the regression models (ABS_ACC and ACC) without French 
























Constant 0,2673*** -0,1211*** 
  (20,13) (-7,87) 
NG + 0,0213* - -0,0161 
  (1,65)  (-1,08) 
AGE - -0,0139*** + 0,0045*** 
  (-5,13)  (2,84) 
BIG4 - 0,0084** - -0,0173*** 
  (2,10)  (-3,75) 
GROWTH + 0,0212*** + 0,0165*** 
  (10,05)  (6,75) 
LEVERAGE + -0,0008 - -0,0227** 
  (-0,08)  (-2,04) 
SIZE - -0,0269*** + 0,0112*** 
   (-13,51)  (4,87) 
COUNTRY   YES   YES 
YEAR   YES   YES 
Obs.   6849   6849 
R-squared  0,0682 
 0,0173 
P-value   0,0000   0,0000 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The t test statistics are 
presented in parenthesis.  
(1) Regression results (ABS_ACC) ; (2) Regression results (ACC) 
Variables: ACC Total abnormal accruals; ABS_ACC Total abnormal accruals in absolute value ; NG 
Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings and, 0 otherwise; AGE Logarithm of 
the company´s age in years; BIG4 Dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm 
and, 0 otherwise; GROWTH Growth rate by change in sales; LEVERAGE  Debt level (short and 
long-term) in percentage of total assets; SIZE Logarithm of company´s total assets. 
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Simultaneously, regression (2) presents similar results. All variables have the same 
coefficient sign and the results obtained are statistically significant for the mostly 
variables included comparing with the previous regression. The variable NG is no longer 
statistically significant, and Leverage is now statistically significant. 
Table VI. Results from the logit regression model without French and German 


















      -9,3962***  
(-10,65) 
ACC -        -0,0818 












































LOSS +      0,0207 
       (0,07) 








Size +      1,0862*** 




COUNTRY            YES 
YEAR           YES 
Observations       6848 
R-squared           0,3616 
P-value           0,0000 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The z test statistics is presented in 
parenthesis.  
Variables: NG Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings and, 0 otherwise; ACC Total abnormal 
accruals; ACC_LPNG Total abnormal accruals if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings on the last period; 
ACC_NEG_LPNG Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings having negative accruals and, 0 
otherwise; AGE Logarithm of the company´s age in years; BIG4 Dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by a 
Big 4 auditing firm and, 0 otherwise; GROWTH Growth rate by change in sales; LOSS Dummy coded 1 if the 
company has negative net income and; 0 otherwise; LEVERAGE  Debt level (short and long-term) in percentage 
of total assets; SIZE Logarithm of company´s total assets. 
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As regards the logit regression model, the results obtained were also similar, in terms 
of coefficients sign, since all variables maintain their initial sign. The main difference 
refers to leverage that is no longer a statistically significant variable. 
The exclusion of France and Germany from the sample showed to have no significant 
impact on conclusions achieved before promoting main analysis´s robustness. 
5.2. Direction of accrual-based earnings management and non-GAAP reporting 
(sample sub-division) 
In order to explore the relation between non-GAAP earnings reporting and the 
direction of accruals, an additional analysis was performed concerning the dependent 
variable ACC with a sign. 
Two sub-samples were created, one in which the value of accruals is negative and 
another positive. Table VII summarizes the results. The first column represents the 
companies that use discretionary accruals to reduce earnings, that is, perform downward 
earnings management. The second column shows the results concerning the companies 
that manage earnings upwards. 
As seen, the previous conclusions are validated. The NG variable shows a positive 
statistically significant coefficient in the group of companies that manage earnings 
downwards. There is evidence that companies that perform downward earnings 
management tend to disclose non-GAAP earnings. No evidence was found that upward 
earnings management influences reports of non-GAAP earnings.  
These results are of great value since strongly support the assumption that non-GAAP 
reporting is related with downward AEM. According with main analysis, the 
simultaneous use of non-GAAP earnings and downward AEM promote a different 
outcome. Non-GAAP is used to improve earnings and, in opposition, downward AEM is 
used to decrease earnings. Thus, the simultaneous strategic use of both metrics creates a 
complementarity effect between them. 
These results also suggest that the company´s growth prospects, size and age are not 
influenced by the direction of accruals. 
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Constant 0,2855*** -0,1211*** 
  (27,86) (-7,87) 
NG + 0,0200** - 0,0212 
  (2,40)  (1,03) 
AGE - -0,0158*** + -0,0127*** 
  (-7,84)  (-3,03) 
BIG4 + 0,0070** - 0,0014 
  (2,18)  (0,21) 
GROWTH - 0,0212*** + 0,0741*** 
  (3,10)  (19,92) 
LEVERAGE + -0,0096 - 0,0147 
  (-1,26)  (0,93) 
SIZE - -0,0258*** - -0,0224*** 
   (-17,25)  (-6,82) 
COUNTRY   YES   YES 
YEAR   YES   YES 
Obs.   8239   4225 
R-squared  0,0724 
 0,1168 
P-value   0,0000   0,0000 
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The t test statistics is 
presented in parenthesis.  
(1) Regression results (negative ACC in absolute value); (2) Regression results (positive ACC) 
Variables: ACC Total abnormal accruals; ABS_ACC Total abnormal accruals in absolute value ; NG 
Dummy coded 1 if the company disclose non-GAAP earnings and, 0 otherwise; AGE Logarithm of 
the company´s age in years; BIG4 Dummy coded 1 if the company is audited by a Big 4 auditing firm 
and, 0 otherwise; GROWTH Growth rate by change in sales; LEVERAGE  Debt level (short and 
long-term) in percentage of total assets; SIZE Logarithm of company´s total assets. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this research is to explore to what extent earnings management 
mechanisms, specifically, management by accruals, are correlated with non-GAAP 
reporting. Accruals earnings management was measured following the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al., 1995), developed by Kothari et al. (2005), in order to get abnormal 
accruals. Additionally, I develop two different models. The first model, to study the 
correlation between both practices in terms of earnings management intensity and 
direction. The second model, to investigate the probability of a non-GAAP disclosure 
related with the degree of earnings management, considering a timeline of events. The 
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sample is composed by 2 122 European listed companies, from 14 European countries, 
with an established time horizon from 2011 to 2018. 
The empirical findings of this study suggest that a non-GAAP disclosure is positively 
correlated with high intensity of AEM. Thus, a strategic use of AEM and non-GAAP 
reporting is driven by an opportunistic motive. Managers who release non-GAAP 
earnings are affected by the desire to disrupt financial information user´s perception. This 
conclusion is robustly reinforced through an additional analysis. 
 Moreover, I provide statistical evidence suggesting that non-GAAP reporting is 
correlated with downward AEM. Both practices are apparently motivated by different 
reasons when they are simultaneously used. While non-GAAP reporting improves 
earnings, AEM reduces them. This result indicates that both metrics are used as 
complement tools, not consistent with Doyle et al. (2013) and Black, Christensen, Taylor 
and Schmardebeck (2017).  I perform an additional analysis whose results strongly 
support these conclusions.  
Lastly, taking into consideration a timeline of events, I provide evidence indicating 
that whether a manager performs downward earnings management, he is more likely to 
report non-GAAP earnings. Besides, the obtained results grant that managers tend to 
report non-GAAP earnings continually over the years since a disclosure gap might be 
seen as attempting to mislead financial information users. 
My conclusions, obtained through this research, enable development of knowledge 
about a relationship between these two widely addressed academic fields, so far weakly 
explained by prior research. In addition, given the fact that the sample is composed by 
companies of different regions of Europe, the results obtained might be considered 
extremely representative.   
The major limitation of the study is related to the fact that the sample presents just 
2,7% of observations associated with non-GAAP reporting practices, which may suggest 
that Factiva is not the most indicated database for non-GAAP reports researches since 
this representation does not correspond with previous studies. Furthermore, as other 
studies concerning earnings management, the inferences produced are limited by the 
ability of AEM proxy. 
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I believe that the geographic location plays an important role in both practices. In fact, 
Burghstahler et al.(2006), Leuz (2010) and Isidro and Marques (2015) argue that the 
economic and legal conditions of the country where the company runs its activity 
influence managers´ disclosure practices.  Therefore, I encourage future research to more 
comprehensively determine the location effect in such association. Other investigation 
that might enrich existent literature, is to do a similar study to understand the effect of 
earnings management alternative measures, such as real earnings management, on non-
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Table I. Sample composition by country 




Austria 203 1,63 % 
Belgium 239 1,92 % 
Deutschland 2587 20,75 % 
Denmark 228 1,83 % 
Spain 702 5,63 % 
Finland 614 4,93 % 
France 3029 24,30 % 
Great Britain 781 6,27 % 
Greece 877 7,04 % 
Ireland 25 0,20 % 
Italy 1137 9,12 % 
Netherlands 97 0,78% 
Portugal 100 0,80 % 
Sweden 1846 14,81 % 
Total 12 465 100% 
 
Table II. Sample composition by industry sector 




C - Manufacturing 3093 24,81 % 
D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply 
199 1,60 % 
E - Water supply; sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities 
105 0,84 % 
F - Construction 320 2,57 % 
G - Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
1258 10,09 % 
H - Transportation and storage 300 2,41 % 
I - Accommodation and food service activities 133 1,07 % 
J - Information and communication 1713 13,74 % 
K - Financial and insurance activities 30 0,24 % 
L - Real estate activities 640 5,13 % 
M - Professional, scientific and technical activities 4267 34,23 % 
N - Administrative and support service activities 381 3,06 % 
S - Other service activities 27 0,22 % 
Total 12 465 100% 
 
FRANCISCO ARANDA CORREIA: AN ESSAY ON STRATEGIC USE OF NON-GAAP REPORTING AND ACCRUAL-






Table III. Variables Characterization 




ACC Total abnormal accruals obtained 
through Jones model developed by 
Kothari et al. (2005). 
3 n.a. 
4 ? 
ABS_ACC Total abnormal accruals in absolute 
value obtained through Jones model 
developed by Kothari et al. (2005). 
3 n.a. 
.NG Binary variable coded 1 if the company 
disclose non-GAAP earnings and, 0 





(+ ; -) 
 
4 n.a. 
Explanatory/Control Variables –Non-GAAP reporting in the previous year and direction of 
accruals in the current period 
ACC_LPNG Total abnormal accruals in the current 
period whether the company disclose non-
GAAP earnings on the last economic period. 
4 + 
ACC_NEG_LPNG Binary variable coded 1 if the company 
disclose non-GAAP earnings in the last 
period having negative accruals on current 
period and, 0 otherwise. 
4 + 
Explanatory/Control Variables – Company´s complexity 
AGE Measured as the logarithm of the 




(- ; +) 
4 + 
SIZE Measured as the logarithm of 
company´s total assets. 
3(ABS_ACC; 
ACC)  
(- ; +) 
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Explanatory/Control Variables – Scrutiny 
LOSS Dummy variable coded 1 if the 
company presents a negative net 
income and; 0 otherwise. 
4 + 
LEVERAGE Debt level (short and long-term) in 




(+ ; -) 
4 - 
Explanatory/Control Variables – Others 
GROWTH Growth rate measured as the percentage 
(%) of change in sales; variable for 








Dummy variable coded 1 if the 
company is audited by a Big 4 auditing 
firm and, 0 otherwise; variable for 








Combined dummy variables for each year. It is coded 1 if the data is referred to the 
respective year and, 0 otherwise. 
Industry 
Combined dummy variables for each industry. It is coded 1 if the data is referred to 
the respective industry and, 0 otherwise. 
Country 
Combined dummy variables for each country. It is coded 1 if the data is referred to 
the respective country and, 0 otherwise. 
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